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The ‘daylight saving effect’ predicts that the mean weekend return following the spring and 
fall/autumn changes in daylight saving time is less than the mean weekend return throughout 
the rest of the year. With this market anomaly, the change in market participants’ behaviour is 
linked with sleep desynchronosis and the change in circadian rhythm and its negative impact 
on sleep patterns. This study investigates the purported daylight saving effect in Australian 
equity market returns over the period 1979/80-2002/03 using parametric testing and 
regression analysis. After adjustments are made for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in 
the data, neither the transition to nor the movement from daylight saving is associated with 
returns that differ from other days. The results also show the absence of any significant 
weekend effect in the Australian equity market. 





In a recent provocative article, Kamstra et al. (2000) found that the average Friday-to-Monday 
stock return on daylight saving weekends was 200 to 500 percent larger than the average 
negative return for other weekends (the so-called ‘weekend-effect’ market anomaly) and 
thereby associated with a one-day loss of US$31 billion on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ 
markets alone. Kamstra’s et al. (2000) findings appeared to hold not only in the United States 
and Canada, where the transition to and from daylight saving is broadly similar, but also in 
the United Kingdom, whose patterns differ from that in North America, and to a lesser extent 
in Germany. On this basis, Kamstra et al. (2000: 1010) suggested that if daylight saving was 
associated with “…the sort of impact investigated here, an obvious policy implication is to do 
away with the time change altogether”.  
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The essence of Kamstra’s et al (2000) argument is that the ‘daylight saving effect’ is linked 
with sleep desynchronosis associated with the change in the circadian rhythm and its 
(negative) impact on sleep patterns. Every Spring at 2:00 a.m. on the first Sunday in April US 
clocks are moved forward one hour, and the following Fall (Autumn) at 2:00 a.m. on the last 
Sunday in October clocks are moved back one hour. As with jet lag, where changes in sleep 
patterns are thought to persist up to five days for each one-hour time zone crossed 
(Waterhouse et al. 1997), the movement to daylight saving time also compresses the day, 
while the movement from daylight saving stretches it, and this also impacts upon sleep 
patterns. If, and as hypothesised by Kamstra et al. (2000: 1006), “…sleep desynchronosis 
causes market participants to suffer greater anxiety about a given situation, ceteris paribus, 
they may prefer safer investments and shun risk in trades during the trading day following 
such a disturbance in their sleep patterns…this could push down stock prices following 
daylight saving shifts when the desynchronosis is systematic”. 
Of course, the argument that shifts to and from daylight saving has an impact upon actual 
behaviour has parallels elsewhere. One possibility is that the change in photoperiod induced 
by daylight saving time may also have an effect on psychiatric presentation. The argument is 
that sleep deprivation, and the manipulation of circadian rhythm associated with the transition 
to daylight saving, alter the clinical state of depressed patients. Moreover, the successful use 
of ‘light therapy’ for treating seasonal affective disorder gives credence to the possibility that 
even a small shift in circadian rhythm has an influence on affective illness. Bick and Hannah 
(1986), for example, linked a 81 percent increase in depressed contacts and a 47 percent 
increase in psychosis-related presentations at a UK crisis intervention centre with the shift to 
daylight saving. However, in another UK study, Shapiro et al. (1990) examined the incidence 
of parasuicide presentations, psychiatric outpatient contacts and inpatient admission, and 
registered suicides following the start of daylight saving, but found no discernible impact 
through either the change in photoperiod or the small impact on the circadian rhythm.  
A further possibility is the impact of daylight saving transition on traffic accidents through 
sleep desynchronosis and the change in circadian rhythm. Sullivan and Flannagan (2002), for 
example, found that pedestrians were three to nearly seven times more likely to be injured 
following transitions to and from daylight saving. Varughese and Allen (2001) also linked a 
small increase in fatal accidents with the Monday following the changeover in the US, while 
in a Canadian study, Coren (1996a, 1996b) measured a significant increase (up to some eight 




comparable decrease in the fall change from daylight saving. By way of contrast, Lambe and 
Cummings (2000) found that the sleep deprivation normally associated with the change over 
to daylight saving had no measurable impact on crash incidence in Sweden. 
All the same, there are a number of complications associated with Kamstra’s et al. (2000) 
purported daylight saving effect, which may not arise in non-financial market contexts. To 
start with, the daylight saving effects exists in parallel with the oft-examined weekend effect, 
for which a number of competing hypotheses have already been put forward and tested [see, 
for instance, Agrawal and Ikenberry (1994), Chang et al. (1993, 1998) and Wang and 
Erickson (1997)]. For example, the weekend effect has been linked to lags in the payment and 
cheque clearing settlements, to midweek time pressures on individuals, the tendency for 
financial advice to be given after Monday strategy-setting meetings, and to the larger 
percentage of purchases (sales) on Fridays (Mondays) at dealer ask (bid) prices (Kamstra et 
al. 2000). It may then be possible that the sleep desynchronosis associated with daylight 
saving weekends is just an alternative manifestation of this more usual market anomaly. For 
example, Pinegar (2002: 1256) countered that “the change in sleeping patterns from weekdays 
to weekends occurs with much greater frequency and is very plausibly more pronounced than 
the change in sleeping patterns between daylight-saving and non-daylight saving weekend. 
Thus sleep desynchronosis may contribute to the so-called ‘day-of-the-week’ effect on non-
daylight saving Mondays also”.  
Another problem is that daylight saving transition weekends are by nature limited in number, 
and these may be juxtaposed with outliers. Once again, Pinegar (2002) questioned Kamstra’s 
et al (2000) conclusions on the basis that in the last eighty years three of the largest 
percentage declines in the S&P 500 took place after a fall daylight-saving time change (most 
recently Monday 26 October 1987). In response, Kamstra et al. (2002) countered, “…while 
we do not believe that daylight-saving-time changes cause market crashes, we do believe that 
daylight-saving-time changes affect the degree of market fluctuations…we speculate that 
severe downturns are more likely following daylight-saving weekends, and we argue that the 
data support this contention” (original emphasis). Lastly, Pinegar (2000) also argues that the 
apparent corroboration offered by Kamstra’s et al. (2000) inclusion of Canada, Germany and 
the United Kingdom in their analysis may be an illusion associated with the normal influence 
on them by the US market, and that such international evidence should then be treated more 




The purpose of the present paper is to add to this small but intriguing body of work the results 
of an analysis of the Australian equity market. To the author’s knowledge this is the first of its 
kind in Australia, and adds significantly to the nascent literature concerning the economic 
benefits and costs of daylight saving. The paper itself is divided into four main areas. The first 
section reviews the concept of daylight saving. The second section explains the empirical 
methodology and data collection employed in the analysis. The third section discusses the 
results. The paper ends with some brief concluding remarks. 
Daylight saving 
For millennia, the measurement of time has been based on the position of the sun, with noon 
being denoted when it is highest in the sky. Even with mechanical clocks replacing sundials in 
the Middle Ages, the measurement of local (or true or apparent) solar time has been bound 
with observation of the sun at noon (or its indirect calculation by means of astronomical 
tables) and time accordingly varied continuously with longitude. Well into the nineteenth 
century time was a genuinely local matter, and most cities and towns used some form of solar 
time, usually reflected in a well-observed standard such as a church or town hall clock. 
Measurement of time in this manner was, of course, entirely appropriate to a society where 
the hours of work and leisure were dictated by the rising and setting of the sun and the 
technological limitations of artificial lighting. 
However, in the latter half of the nineteenth century the inconsistencies of local solar time and 
the demands of railway timetabling in first Britain and then the United States started the 
process of standardising time by region and its replacement with Local Standard Time (LST). 
This opened the way for the eventual implementation of daylight saving. In Britain, uniform 
time, as credited to William Hyde Woolaston (1766-1828) and popularised by Abraham 
Follet Osler (1808-1903), led to the Great Western Railway voluntarily using Greenwich 
Mean Time (GMT) from November 1840. All other railways followed compulsorily in 
December 1847. By 1855, the majority of public clocks in Britain were set to GMT and full 
compliance was ensured in the Statutes (Definition of Time) Act of August 1880.  
In the United States, the railways largely ignored early advocates of standardisation such as 
William Lambert in 1809 and Charles Dowd in 1870 until pressure by Canadian railway 
engineer Sandford Fleming led to the establishment of standard time meridians in both the 
United States and Canada in 1883. Fleming was also instrumental in establishing the 




globe into 24 time zones, each 15 degrees of arc (or one hour in time apart) and reckoned 
from the Prime Meridian of Longitude in Greenwich (GMT). Since then GMT (as derived 
from astronomical observations) has been superseded for most practical purposes by the 
similar Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) as the worldwide standard for time and date (as 
based on an atomic clock). 
The origins of daylight saving itself can be traced as far back as the eighteenth century. In a 
whimsical essay, Benjamin Franklin (1794) – US inventor, statesman and then minister to 
France – reasoned how rising and retiring earlier according to the sun would prove a 
considerable economy to the people of Paris: 
An accidental sudden noise waked me about six in the morning, when I was surprised to 
find my room filled with light…I got up and looked out to see what might be the 
occasion of it, when I saw the sun just rising above the horizon, from whence he poured 
his rays plentifully into my chamber, my domestic having negligently omitted, the 
previous evening, to close the shutters…if I had not been awakened so early in the 
morning, I should have slept six hours longer by the light of the sun, and in exchange 
have lived six hours the following night by candlelight; the latter being a much more 
expensive light than the former…I believe all who have common sense, as soon as they 
have learnt from this paper that it is daylight when the sun rises, will contrive to rise 
with him. 
Later, London builder William Willett (1907) in a pamphlet entitled “The Waste of Daylight” 
outlined more fully the concept of daylight saving as it is known today [though in the form of 
an eighty minute gain achieved through four successive weekly jumps of twenty minutes 
during April]: 
[S]tandard time remains so fixed, that for nearly half the year the sun shines upon the 
land for several hours each day while we are asleep, and is rapidly nearing the horizon, 
having already passed its western limit, when we reach home after the work of the day is 
over. Under the most favourable circumstances, there then remains only a brief spell of 
declining daylight in which to spend the short period of leisure at our disposal. Now, if 
some of the hours of wasted sunlight could be withdrawn from the beginning and added 
to the end of the day, how many advantages would be gained by all, and in particular by 
those in the open air, when light permits them to do so, whatever time they have at their 
command after the duties of the day have been discharged.   
However, it was not until World War I, and largely as a means of energy conservation by the 
combatants, that Daylight Saving Time (DST) was actually implemented. Starting with 
Germany and Austria on 30 April 1916, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Turkey all adopted DST, along with Tasmania 
and the Canadian provinces of Nova Scotia and Manitoba. Britain began DST on 21 May 




The Canadian provinces of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia also started DST in 1917. The US 
enacted legislation on 19 March 1918 to begin DST on 31 March 1918 and this was held in 
place for the remainder of WWI and for another seven months in 1919.  
In the United States, wartime DST proved generally unpopular and it continued in only a few 
states (Massachusetts, Rhode Island) and cities (Chicago, New York, Philadelphia) during the 
interwar period. However, during World War II the Roosevelt administration implemented 
year-round DST, now known as ‘War Time’, from 2 February 1942 to 30 September 1945. 
From 1946 to 1966 the states and localities again reverted to a patchwork of adherence, but by 
then some 100 million Americans in 36 states were observing DST in some form or another 
as defined by local or regional law.  
In order to eliminate what were seen as costly inconsistencies in observance [the Committee 
for Time Uniformity, for example, disclosed that on a 35-mile bus route between Moundsville, 
West Virginia and Steubenville, Ohio, the driver and passengers were obliged to change time 
seven times] the Johnston administration under the Uniform Time Act of 1966 implemented 
DST from the last Sunday of April until the last Sunday of October, with exemptions for 
states whose legislatures voted to keep the entire state on standard time. Congress revised the 
act in 1972 such that if a state was in two or more time zones, exemptions could be made for 
different parts of the state, while on 4 January 1974 the Nixon administration extended DST 
to conserve energy during the OPEC oil crisis for the fifteen-month period to 27 April 1975. 
Finally, in 1986 the Reagan administration brought forward the start of DST from the last 
Sunday in April to the first Sunday, with no change to the ending date. 
DST is currently observed in all US states and territories with the exception of Hawaii, 
American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and Arizona (excluding the Navajo 
Indian Reservation). In Indiana, seventy-seven counties (including Indianapolis the state 
capital) in the central portion remain on Eastern Standard Time (EST) year round, and hence 
do not use DST, while ten counties in the western portion in Central Standard Time (CST) use 
both CST and Central Daylight Time (CDT), and thus move to DST in summer. The 
remaining five counties in the eastern portion on EST move to Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) 
and therefore also use DST.      
In Britain, DST was also used again during World War II though with clocks moving ahead 
of GMT by two hours in the summer and by one hour during the winter. Between 1968 and 




the last Sunday of March and ends on the last Sunday of October, has been closely tied with 
lobbying for Britain to abandon GMT in favour of Central European Time (CET) (GMT +2 in 
summer and +1 in winter) and thereby bring it in line with the other members of the European 
Union, with the exception of Ireland (GMT) and Greece (GMT +2).    
In common with the US and Britain, Australia also used DST as an energy conservation 
measure during WWII operating from 1 January to 29 March 1942, 27 September 1942 to 28 
March 1943 and 3 October 1943 to 26 March 1944 (with the exception of Western Australia 
in the final period). DST was not used again until 1967/68 to 1970/71 when Tasmania (with 
the exception of King Island) initially adopted it as a means of managing the severe shortage 
in hydroelectric power associated with a drought. The positive experience with DST in 
Tasmania prompted it to champion a trial season in 1971/72 that was supported by all states 
and territories except Western Australia and the Northern Territory.  
Participation in DST by the various states and territories since the trial season has been 
erratic. Queensland did not adopt DST again until 1989/90, and then only until 1991/92 when 
it was abandoned following the results of a referendum. In the same thirty-year period 
Western Australia only followed DST in 1974/75, 1983/84 and 1991/92 and also discontinued 
use following a referendum on the matter. The Northern Territory has never adopted DST. 
Usage in the remaining states and territory was largely consistent until 1981/82 when 
Victoria, the ACT and South Australia ended in early March, NSW in late March and 
Tasmania in early April, and 1982/83 when New South Wales, the ACT, Victoria and South 
Australia ended DST three weeks earlier than Tasmania. Since then, there have been at least 
two sets of start and end dates for DST in Australia (with the exception of 1983/84 and 
1984/85), with three different sets of start and end dates in 1990/91, 1993/94 and 1994/95, 
though since 1995/96 Victoria, NSW, ACT and SA (but not Tasmania) have begun and ended 
DST at the same time.  
Putting aside the one-off adjustments to DST for festivals and special events that have 
characterised its usage in the past, even a normal year of daylight saving in Australia involves 
some degree of complexity. Without DST Australia has three time zones spaced over two 
hours: Australian Eastern Standard Time (AEST) (UTC +10) in Queensland, NSW, the ACT, 
Victoria and Tasmania, Australian Central Standard Time (ACST) (UTC +9.5) in the 
Northern Territory and South Australia, and Australian Western Standard Time (AWST) 
(UTC +8) in Western Australia. In 2002/03, the move to DST entailed two additional time 




Eastern Daylight Time (AEDT) (UTC +11) from 6 October, Victoria, NSW and the ACT on 
AEST (UTC + 10) until the shift to AEDT (UTC +11) on 27 October, South Australia on 
ACST (UTC +9.5) until 27 October and then Australian Central Daylight Time (ACDT) 
(UTC +10.5), Queensland on AEST (UTC +10), the Northern Territory on ACST (UTC + 
9.5) and Western Australia on AWST (UTC +8). On 30 March 2003 DST ended in all 
observing states and territories and the number of time zones and time spread fell again to 
three zones and two hours, respectively.       
Outside of the US, Britain and Australia, DST is found in nearly all developed economies 
(with the exception of Japan) and many developing economies in some form or another, 
though observance is somewhat unpredictable. As a general rule, it is less prevalent in 
equatorial and sub-tropical (lower latitudes) countries where the gain in sunlight in summer 
over winter is less. Russia and most states of the former USSR observe DST with all of 
Russia’s eleven time zones two hours ahead of standard time in summer and one hour in 
winter. All members of the European Union implement DST with summer time running from 
the last Sunday in March through the last Sunday in October. Parts of the Caribbean, Cuba, 
Israel, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Chile, China, Mongolia, Paraguay, New Zealand, and even 
Antarctica, also observe DST. DST is found across Canada with the exception of 
Saskatchewan and in Brazil excluding equatorial Brazil. Mexico also uses DST, however the 
border city of Sonora has dispensation to align itself with non-daylight saving Arizona 
(Waxman 1998), while there have been moves by the left-wing mayor of Mexico City to also 
opt out of DST (Anonymous 2001).     
Research method and data 
Two dates are relevant for countries in the northern hemisphere implementing summer time 
DST: (i) a Sunday a.m. starting time and date, usually in early April, and (ii) a Sunday a.m. 
ending time and date, normally in late October in the same year. In the southern hemisphere, 
as in Australia, the starting and ending months are reversed and in succeeding years. 
However, one complication that does exist in Australia is that not all states and territories 
currently use DST, and of those that do the timing and adherence to the usual starting and 
ending dates has varied over the last several decades. As shown in Table 1, of Australia’s six 
states and two territories only New South Wales (NSW), Victoria (VIC), South Australia 
(SA), Tasmania (TAS) and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) have implemented DST 




DST spasmodically, from 1989/90 to 1991/92 and in 1983/84 and 1991/92, respectively. The 
Northern Territory (not shown) has never used DST. 
Moreover, even amongst practicing states there is much variation in the dates at which DST 
starts and ends such that over the period 1979/80 to 2002/03 there have been either one or two 
different starting dates and between one and three ending dates. However, this is not unlike 
the situation in other federations such as the United States and Canada. For example, in the 
US only 36 of the 50 states had adopted DST in the 1960s and even today Hawaii, Arizona, 
most of Indiana and none of the territories use DST, nor does Saskatchewan in Canada. In 
order to reflect these differences in the current analysis, two sets of starting dates and three 
sets of ending dates are identified.  
The first set of starting dates are where the most populous states of NSW and VIC both shift 
to DST at the same time. This accounts for 24 cases in the 24 years in the sample and on most 
occasions include most of the remaining states and territories. The second set is when a state 
or territory other than NSW or VIC commences DST on some other date. This represents 11 
cases in 24 years. The other set of dates is the DST ending dates and these comprise three 
categories: (i) occasions when NSW and VIC shifted from DST at the same times (19 cases), 
(ii) dates when NSW and VIC moved out of DST at different times (4 cases in each respect) 
and (iii) dates when a state or territory other than NSW and VIC shifted out of DST (8 cases) 
at a different time to NSW and VIC. As before, at least some other states and territories may 
also have moved out of DST at these times. Accordingly, in the twenty-four year sample there 
have been thirty-five weekends in Australia where DST started at 2:00 a.m. on Sunday and 
thirty-five weekends where DST ended on Sunday at 3:00 a.m.  
To test for the economic effect of daylight saving time change we look at the first trading day 
following the transition to or from DST. The data employed in the study are market returns 
drawn from the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) over the period 2 January 1980 to 5 May 
2003. Both the All Ordinaries Price and Accumulation (including dividends and capitalisation 
changes) Indices are used. Following Kamstra et al. (2001, 2002) and Pinegar (2002) a series 
of daily raw returns are calculated of which three categories are identified. These are: (i) a 
weekend return calculated from the Friday and Monday closing prices for weekends that do 
not include a DST starting or ending Sunday, (ii) a DST starting and ending weekend return 
calculated using the Friday and Monday closing prices for weekends including a DST starting 




The DST starting and ending weekends are further categorised according to the different sets 
of starting and ending dates discussed above. 
The basic hypothesis examined in this analysis is that the change to DST impacts upon sleep 
patterns in such a way that the daily returns for the next trading day following such a 
transition will differ from other days. Further, since the transition to (and from) DST has the 
effect of stretching (compressing) the day, and thereby having a negative (positive) effect on 
sleep patterns, the returns for the next trading day will be less (more) than other day returns. 
Finally, since the ‘daylight saving effect’ exists in parallel to the usual ‘weekend effect’ the 
magnitude of the change will be larger (smaller) than the expected (negative) weekend effect.  
Two approaches are used to test these hypotheses. The first involves a descriptive analysis of 
the mean returns and tests of equality of these means using parametric analysis following 
Kamstra et al. (2000). As a rule, the mean return for the start of daylight saving is expected to 
be negative and less than the (negative) return for other weekends, while the mean return for 
the end of daylight saving can be either negative or positive, though the mean return should 
be higher than that for daylight saving or other weekends. The second is a regression-based 
approach where daily market returns are regressed against variables indicating the presence of 
daylight saving and weekend effects: 
t t t t t ε END β STT β WKD β β RTN + + + + = 3 2 1 0         (1) 
where RTNt is the daily Monday to Friday market return at time t, STT is a dummy variable 
that equals one on a Monday following a weekend when DST started, END a dummy variable 
that equals one on a Monday following a weekend when DST ended,  WKD  a dummy 
variable that equals one for all other Mondays, β are coefficients to be estimated and ε is the 
error term. This approach follows that used Pinegar (2002). Following the hypotheses 
presented, the signs on the coefficients for WKD and STT are both expected to be negative, 
though the magnitude of STT is hypothesised to be larger than WKD, while the hypothesised 
sign on the coefficient for END is positive.  
Empirical findings 
Table 2 presents the summary of descriptive statistics for daily market returns. These are 
categorised according to the daylight saving and weekend effects hypothesised: namely, (i) 
non-DST starting or ending weekends, (ii) DST starting weekends common to NSW and VIC, 




but not VIC, (v) DST ending weekends for VIC but not NSW, (vi) DST starting weekends for 
other states and territories that were not shared by NSW and/or VIC, (vii) DST ending 
weekends for other states and territories that that were not shared by NSW and/or VIC, and 
(viii) all other days. Price returns are depicted in the upper portion of Table 1, while 
accumulation returns (including dividends and capitalisation changes) are presented in the 
lower portion. Sample means, trimmed means, medians, standard deviations, minimums, 
maximums, skewness, kurtosis and t-statistics and p-values for the equality of means are 
reported. Tests of equality of means are also included, comparing the mean returns for all 
other categories to other day returns and for all other categories to weekend returns. 
At first impression, there appears to be some evidence of both the weekend and daylight 
saving effects in the Australian stock market. In terms of price returns, the mean weekend 
return (0.00017) is less that for other days (0.00039) while the mean DST starting returns are 
negative for both NSW and VIC (-0.00204) and other states (-0.00317) and generally positive 
for the DST ending returns (NSW and VIC 0.00182, NSW 0.00313, VIC 0.00481 and other 
states -0.00534). These mean price returns are broadly comparable to mean accumulation 
returns with the exception that the starting DST returns for NSW are no longer negative.  
However, the t-tests comparing these mean returns to other days and weekends indicate that 
few of these differences are statistically significant. The starting DST mean price return is 
significantly less than other days at the .10 level suggesting that the mean return for Mondays 
following the introduction of DST in NSW and VIC is six times less than other days, while 
the return for other states starting DST is about thirteen times less. But these mean differences 
are no longer significant when specified in terms of returns on the accumulation index. In that 
instance, only the mean return for other states starting and ending DST are significant (at the 
.10 and .05 levels, respectively) suggesting mean accumulation returns are between six and 
nine times less for Mondays following the starting and ending of DST in states other than 
NSW and VIC where such dates differ. 
Significance tests for the differences of means as compared to weekend returns offer a similar 
picture. For the price index, only the mean returns for other states ending DST is significant at 
a conventional level but does not conform to the hypothesised direction, whereas in the 
accumulation index the start and end of DST in states and dates other than NSW and VIC are 
also significant at the .10 level. In sum, the tests of differences in means show that price 
returns for Mondays following the introduction of DST are less than the returns for others 




state or territory has introduced DST on a day that differs from NSW and VIC. For 
accumulation returns, the mean return is less for Mondays following both the start or ending 
of DST in a state other than NSW and VIC. Lastly, the mean return for DST starting 
weekends in accumulation terms and DST ending weekends in price and accumulation returns 
is significantly less than other weekend returns, but only for DST starting and ending dates 
outside of NSW and/or VIC. 
The estimated coefficients and standard errors of the parameters detailed in (1) are presented 
in Table 3. The upper portion of Table 3 is where the dependent variable is specified as daily 
Monday to Friday price returns, while the lower portion details the results of regressions 
where daily accumulation returns comprise the dependent variable. The independent variables 
in all instances are dummy variables for DST starting (STT) and ending (END) and other 
weekends (WKD). However, in the first regression for price and accumulation returns, the 
dummy variables are identified for all DST starting and ending dates, while in the second 
regression in each case these are DST starting and ending dates in NSW and/or VIC only. 
Three different standard errors, t-statistics and p-values are calculated and presented in Table 
3 for each of the four regression models. These are standard errors, t-statistics and p-values 
obtained by: (i) ordinary least squares (Least Squares), (ii) those employing corrections for 
heteroskedasticity of unknown form (White), and (iii) those incorporating corrections for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form (Newey-West). 
Once again, the signs on the estimated coefficients appear to offer prima facie support for the 
posited daylight saving effect. The signs on WKD and STT are always negative, with the 
magnitude of STT being larger, suggesting the presence simultaneously of both the weekend 
and daylight saving effect market anomalies. That is, the weekend effect is associated with a 
lower mean return than others days and the start of DST is linked with a larger negative effect 
as compared to other weekends. The sign on END is likewise consistence with the hypothesis 
that mean returns following the end of DST are positive, or at least higher, than the mean 
returns of DST starting and non-starting weekends. However, only in the case of DST starting 
weekends are the least squares estimates of market returns significant. After corrections are 
made for heteroskedasticity (White) and heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West) 
none of the parameters are significant at any conventional level, irrespective of whether 
market returns are specified in price or accumulation terms, or whether the transition 
weekends are in all Australian states and territories or only NSW and VIC. On average, 




or low when compared to other weekends or other days of the week. Furthermore, there is no 
significant difference between weekend returns as defined (Friday-Monday) and daily returns 
Monday-Tuesday, Tuesday-Wednesday, Wednesday-Thursday and Friday-Thursday.      
Concluding remarks and policy recommendations 
The present study employs parametric analysis to test for the ‘daylight saving effect’ market 
anomaly in the Australian stock market. At first there would appear to be a small of amount of 
empirical evidence to support the conjecture that the transition to (and from) daylight saving, 
as variously defined, is associated with a lower (higher) mean market return than either other 
weekends or other days. However, after adjustments are made for heteroskedasticity and/or 
autocorrelation, neither the transition to daylight saving nor the movement from daylight 
saving is associated with returns that are statistically significant from other days, let alone 
other weekends. These results lie counter to the US, UK and Canadian findings of Kamstra et 
al. (2000, 2002) but are similar to the results of Pinegar (2002: 1255) who also found that the 
hypothesis that “…mean weekend returns are significantly lower following changes in 
daylight-saving vis-à-vis other weekends is not robust”. Indeed, there would also appear to be 
no evidence in this study to support even the well-investigated hypotheses underlying the 
weekend effect market anomaly. Daylight saving in Australia may be opposed on a number of 
policy grounds, but it would appear that adverse affects on capital markets should not be one 
of them. 
Of course, the sleep desynchronosis linked with the transition to and from daylight saving 
may have a role to play in financial markets that has not been investigated here. All of these 
indicate future directions for research. One possibility follows the suggestion of Pinegar 
(2002) that changes in sleep patterns may amplify the impact of negative news and that the 
true impact of daylight saving, or indeed any other source of sleep disturbance, may be 
measured by how daylight saving transition weekends affect the magnitude of positive and/or 
negative changes, rather than positive and/or negative changes themselves. Another 
possibility is that the adjustment process to daylight saving may be slower than that 
hypothesised, and that the full effect of sleep desynchronosis may be felt at less significance 
over several days rather than the twenty-four hours employed here. Lambe and Cummings 
(2000), for example, point out that the adjustment process in daylight saving may be longer 
than jet lag because of the absence of new external reference points to the change in time. 




anomalies, is felt more keenly in small companies than large. Since this study uses market-
weighted stock indices as against price or equal-weighted market indices or small cap sector 
indices, such differences may well be obscured.   
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TABLE 1. Implementation dates of daylight saving time within Australia, 1979/80 – 2002/03 
 NSW  VIC  QLD  SA  WA  TAS  ACT  Total 
Year Start End Start End Start End Start End Start End Start End Start End Start End 
1979-80 28-Oct  2-Mar  28-Oct 2-Mar –  – 28-Oct 2-Mar –  – 28-Oct 2-Mar  28-Oct 2-Mar 1  1 
1980-81 26-Oct  1-Mar  26-Oct 1-Mar –  – 26-Oct 1-Mar –  – 26-Oct 1-Mar  26-Oct 1-Mar 1  3 
1981-82 25-Oct  4-Apr  25-Oct 7-Mar –  – 25-Oct 7-Mar –  – 25-Oct 28-Mar 25-Oct 7-Mar 1  2 
1982-83 31-Oct  6-Mar  31-Oct 6-Mar –  – 31-Oct 6-Mar –  – 31-Oct 27-Mar 31-Oct 6-Mar 1  1 
1983-84 30-Oct 4-Mar 30-Oct 4-Mar  –  –  30-Oct 4-Mar 30-Oct 4-Mar 30-Oct 4-Mar 30-Oct 4-Mar  1  1 
1984-85 28-Oct  3-Mar  28-Oct 3-Mar –  – 28-Oct 3-Mar –  – 28-Oct 3-Mar  28-Oct 3-Mar 1  1 
1985-86 27-Oct 16-Mar 27-Oct 16-Mar –  –  27-Oct 16-Mar –  –  27-Oct 2-Mar  27-Oct 16-Mar 1  2 
1986-87 19-Oct 15-Mar 19-Oct 15-Mar –  –  19-Oct 15-Mar –  –  19-Oct 15-Mar 19-Oct 15-Mar 1  1 
1987-88 25-Oct 20-Mar 25-Oct 20-Mar –  –  25-Oct 20-Mar –  –  25-Oct 20-Mar 25-Oct 20-Mar 1  1 
1988-89 30-Oct 19-Mar 30-Oct 19-Mar –  –  30-Oct 19-Mar –  –  30-Oct 19-Mar 30-Oct 19-Mar 1  1 
1989-90 29-Oct 4-Mar 29-Oct 18-Mar 29-Oct 4-Mar 29-Oct 18-Mar –  –  29-Oct 18-Mar 29-Oct 4-Mar  1  2 
1990-91 28-Oct 17-Mar 28-Oct 3-Mar  28-Oct 17-Mar 28-Oct 3-Mar  –  –  28-Oct 3-Mar  28-Oct 17-Mar 1  2 
1991-92 27-Oct 1-Mar 27-Oct 1-Mar 27-Oct 1-Mar 27-Oct 22-Mar 27-Oct 1-Mar 27-Oct 27-Oct 27-Oct 1-Mar  1  3 
1992-93 25-Oct  7-Mar  25-Oct 7-Mar –  – 25-Oct 7-Mar –  – 4-Oct  7-Mar  25-Oct 7-Mar 2  2 
1993-94 31-Oct 6-Mar 31-Oct 6-Mar  –  –  31-Oct 20-Mar –  –  31-Oct 27-Mar 31-Oct 6-Mar  2  3 
1994-95 30-Oct 5-Mar 30-Oct 26-Mar –  –  30-Oct 26-Mar –  –  2-Oct 26-Mar 30-Oct 5-Mar  2  3 
1995-96 29-Oct 31-Mar 29-Oct 31-Mar –  –  29-Oct 31-Mar –  –  1-Oct  31-Mar 29-Oct 31-Mar 2  1 
1996-97 27-Oct 30-Mar 27-Oct 30-Mar –  –  27-Oct 30-Mar –  –  6-Oct  30-Mar 27-Oct 30-Mar 2  1 
1997-98 26-Oct 29-Mar 26-Oct 29-Mar –  –  26-Oct 29-Mar –  –  5-Oct  29-Mar 26-Oct 29-Mar 2  1 
1998-99 25-Oct 28-Mar 25-Oct 28-Mar –  –  25-Oct 28-Mar –  –  4-Oct  28-Mar 25-Oct 28-Mar 2  1 
1999-00 31-Oct 26-Mar 31-Oct 26-Mar –  –  31-Oct 26-Mar –  –  3-Oct  26-Mar 31-Oct 26-Mar 2  1 
2000-01 27-Aug  25-Mar  27-Aug 25-Mar – –  29-Oct 25-Mar – –  27-Aug 25-Mar 27-Aug 25-Mar 2 1 
2001-02 28-Oct 31-Mar 28-Oct 31-Mar –  –  28-Oct 31-Mar –  –  7-Oct  31-Mar 28-Oct 31-Mar 2  1 
2002-03 27-Oct 30-Mar 27-Oct 30-Mar –  –  27-Oct 30-Mar –  –  6-Oct  30-Mar 27-Oct 30-Mar 2  1 
Source: Commonwealth Bureau of Meteorology. Notes: NSW – New South Wales, VIC – Victoria, QLD – Queensland, SA – South Australia, WA –
Western Australia, TAS – Tasmania, ACT – Australian Capital Territory. Remaining state/territory of Northern Territory has never implemented Daylight 
Saving Time. Start – starting date of Daylight Saving Time, end – ending date of Daylight Saving Time. In all cases listed the change to Daylight Saving 
Time took place at 0200 hours Local Standard Time on the day concerned, and from Daylight Saving Time to Local Standard Time at 0300 hours. All 
transitions to and from DST are on Sundays. Total is the number of different start and end dates across the states and territories in each year.  
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TABLE 2. Descriptive analysis of daily return data 
   Number  Mean  Trimmed 
Mean  Median  Std. 




Other  Days  4870 0.00039 0.00049 0.00036 0.00927 -0.24995 0.06254 -4.35098 113.37800 – –  -0.707 (0.240) 
Weekend  1148 0.00017 0.00036 0.00000 0.00965 -0.08096 0.06850 -0.63299 9.17159 0.707 (0.240) – – 
NSW & VIC Start  24 -0.00204 0.00018 -0.00011 0.01483 -0.06555  0.01318 -3.61138 15.68260 1.277 (0.100) 1.098 (0.136) 
NSW & Vic End  19  0.00182 0.00140 0.00176 0.00787 -0.00935  0.02049 0.68897 0.24247 -0.672 (0.251) -0.740 (0.230) 
NSW  End  4 0.00313 0.00333 0.00492 0.00649 -0.00568 0.00835 -1.09243 0.00336 -0.591 (0.277) -0.612 (0.270) 
VIC  End  4 0.00481 0.00512 0.00760 0.00730 -0.00586 0.00989 -1.72021 2.92337 -0.955 (0.170) -0.961 (0.169) 





























Other State End  8  -0.00534 -0.00499 -0.00243 0.00813 -0.01985 0.00296 -0.85440 -0.46222 1.745 (0.041) 1.610 (0.054) 
Other  Days  4870 0.00051 0.00061 0.00048 0.00924 -0.24986 0.06420 -4.38696 114.92855 – – 0.005 (0.498) 
Weekend  1148 0.00051 0.00065 0.00000 0.00986 -0.08007 0.07067 -0.46735 8.72164 -0.005 (0.498) – – 
NSW and VIC Start  24 -0.00267 -0.00042 -0.00005 0.01591 -0.06368  0.01323 -2.85455 9.66039 0.976 (0.170) 1.537 (0.063) 
NSW and Vic End  19  0.00213 0.00158 0.00205 0.00806 -0.00788  0.02189 0.78203 0.42161 -0.763 (0.223) -0.712 (0.239) 
Other  NSW  End  4 0.00336 0.00358 0.00533 0.00658 -0.00565 0.00843 -1.15718 0.26894 -0.618 (0.269) -0.578 (0.282) 
Other  VIC  End  4 0.00514 0.00545 0.00790 0.00742 -0.00562 0.01040 -1.64534 2.59180 -1.004 (0.158) -0.940 (0.174) 



































Other State End  8  -0.00506 -0.00470 -0.00216 0.00797 -0.01958 0.00298 -0.91135 -0.23699 1.704 (0.045) 1.594 (0.056) 
Notes:  DST – daylight saving time, Number – Number of observations in category, NSW & VIC Start (End) - starting (ending) DST weekend mean return where NSW and 
Victoria start (end) DST on the same date, NSW (VIC) End – ending DST weekend mean return where NSW (Victoria) end DST on different dates, Other State Start (End) – 
starting (ending) DST weekend mean return for states other than NSW and Victoria where different to NSW & VIC start (end), Weekend – all non-DST start/end weekend 
mean returns, Other Days – all days other than DST and non-DST weekend mean returns. Five percent trimmed mean. Critical values at the .05 level for skewness and 
kurtosis are: Other Days (0.035, 0.070), Weekend (0.072, 0.145), NSW & VIC Start (0.500, 1.000), NSW & Vic End (0.562, 1.124), NSW End (1.225, 2.449), VIC End 
(1.225, 2.449), Other State Start (0.739, 1.477), Other State End (0.866, 1.732), respectively. Levene’s test for equality of variances determines whether the t-statistics and p-
values for equality of means assume equal or unequal variances. Figures in brackets are p-values, Other Days t-tests – one-sided tests of equality of means to Other Days 
mean returns, Weekend t-tests – one-sided tests of equality of means to Weekend mean returns. Sample period 2 January 1980 to 5 May 2003.   
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TABLE 3. Estimated coefficients and standard errors from daylight saving regression models 
       Least Squares  White  Newey-West 
  Model Variable  Coefficient Std.  error t-statistic  p-value Std.  error t-statistic  p-value Std.  error t-statistic  p-value 
CNS 0.0004 0.0001 2.8806 0.0040 0.0001  2.9087 0.0036 0.0001 2.6197 0.0088
WKD -0.0002 0.0003 -0.7053 0.4807 0.0003  -0.6893 0.4907 0.0003 -0.6980 0.4852


























END 0.0003 0.0016 0.1813 0.8561 0.0014  0.2104 0.8334 0.0014 0.2012 0.8405
CNS 0.0004 0.0001 2.7564 0.0059 0.0001  2.7836 0.0054 0.0001 2.5046 0.0123
WKD -0.0002 0.0003 -0.6489 0.5164 0.0003  -0.6342 0.5260 0.0003 -0.6420 0.5209

















































END 0.0021 0.0018 1.1549 0.2482 0.0014  1.4806 0.1388 0.0014 1.4772 0.1397
CNS 0.0005 0.0001 3.7616 0.0002 0.0001  3.8203 0.0001 0.0001 3.4455 0.0006
WKD 0.0000 0.0003 0.0050 0.9960 0.0003  0.0048 0.9961 0.0003 0.0049 0.9961


























END 0.0005 0.0016 0.2911 0.7710 0.0014  0.3352 0.7375 0.0014 0.3209 0.7483
CNS 0.0005 0.0001 3.6375 0.0003 0.0001  3.6947 0.0002 0.0001 3.3301 0.0009
WKD 0.0000 0.0003 0.0623 0.9503 0.0003  0.0600 0.9521 0.0003 0.0609 0.9515























































END 0.0023 0.0018 1.2524 0.2105 0.0014  1.5758 0.1151 0.0014 1.5729 0.1158
Notes: Dependent variable is daily stock returns on price and accumulation index 2 January 1980 to 5 May 2003. CNS – constant, WKD – non-DST 
start/end weekend dummy variable, STT – DST starting weekend dummy variable, END – DST ending weekend dummy variable, All States and 
Territories refers to models including all Australian DST starting and ending weekend dummy variables, NSW and Victoria only model refers to models 
including only NSW/Victoria DST starting and ending weekend dummy variables. Least squares – standard errors, t-statistics and p-values from ordinary 
least squares, White – standard errors, t-statistics and p-values employing corrections for heteroskedasticity of unknown form following White (1980), 
Newey-West – standard errors, t-statistics and p-values employing corrections for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown form following 
Newey and West (1987). 
 